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We examine the connection between the number of bank relationships and firms’ 
performance using a unique data set on Italian small firms for which banks are a 
major source of financing. Our evidence indicates that return on equity and return 
on assets decrease as the number of bank relationships increases, the effects being 
stronger for small firms than for large firms. We also find that the ratio of interest 
expense to assets increases as the number of relationships increases. Particularly 
for small firms, these results are consistent with finding that suggest that having 
fewer bank relationships reduces the information asymmetries and agency 
problems and outweighs the hold-up problems. 
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Tässä työssä tarkastellaan empiirisesti pienten yritysten pankkisuhteiden luku-
määrän ja taloudellisen menestymisen välistä riippuvuutta ainutlaatuisessa otok-
sessa, johon on kerätty tietoja pääasiassa pankkirahoitusta käyttävistä pienistä 
italialaisista yrityksistä. Tulosten mukaan sekä yrityksen osakkeiden että muun 
varallisuuden tuotto heikkenee, kun yrityksen pankkisuhteiden lukumäärä kasvaa. 
Estimoitu negatiivinen riippuvuus yrityksen pankkisuhteiden ja varallisuuden 
tuoton välillä on voimakkaampi pienissä yrityksissä kuin suuremmissa yrityksissä. 
Tulosten mukaan myös korkokulut kasvavat suhteellisesti pankkisuhteiden luku-
määrän kasvaessa. Erityisesti pienten yritysten tapauksessa nämä tulokset korosta-
vat harvemmista pankkisuhteista saatuja hyötyjä, kun informaation epäsymmetria 
ja agentuuriongelmat vähenevät. Näin saadut hyödyt ovat tulosten mukaan suu-
remmat kuin harvemmille pankkisuhteille mahdollisesta pankin monopolivoiman 
väärinkäytöstä aiheutuvat haitat. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkisuhteet, pienten yritysten lainanotto, yritysten suorituskyky 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D21, G21, G32  
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The contemporary literature on relationship banking has developed along two 
main branches corresponding to the lender’s and the borrower’s side of the issue. 
In his review of this topic, Boot (2000) characterises relationship banking and 
evaluates its associated costs and benefits from the lender’s point of view. Ongena 
and Smith (2000) review the other side of the coin, focusing their analytical 
review mainly on the effect of bank relationships on customers. This paper takes 
this latter point of view and focuses on the effect of bank relationships on firms’ 
performance. 
  Empirical results on the effect of bank relationships on firms’ performance are 
mixed. For example, using Norwegian data, Degryse and Ongena (2001) find a 
negative relationship between the number of bank relationships and firms’ 
performance; using Japanese data, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) report a positive 
relationship between the number of bank relationships and firm profitability. 
Ongena and Smith (2000) summarize various estimates of the average number of 
bank relationships per firm across a variety of countries and data sets. The main 
features they highlight are: 1. multiple bank relationships are a common feature in 
nearly all the data sets; 2. small firms tend to have fewer bank relationships than 
large firms; and 3. country effects exist, eg firms in the United Kingdom, Norway 
and Sweden have fewer relationships than firms in Italy, France, Spain, Belgium 
and Portugal. 
  This paper is based on a rich survey data on the banking relationships of 4,500 
Italian manufacturing firms (Capitalia Sample) to examine a set of research 
questions: How do bank relationships affect firm performance? Is a single bank 
relationship associated with better performance than relationships with multiple 
banks? Does duration affect performance? Is there a differential effect connected 
with a firm’s size? 
 This  study  contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, over 95 
per cent of the sample firms report multiple lending relationships. This is similar 
to other continental European Union countries such as Portugal, France, Spain and 
Belgium which report 95, 91, 98 and almost 100 per cent of firms, respectively, 
having multiple lending relationships. This is much different than the United 
Kingdom and Sweden where around 60 per cent of firms report multiple lending 
relationships. In Norway, studied by Degryse and Ongena (2001), only 30 per 
cent of the firms have more than one bank. This feature of continental Europe is 
more evident looking at the median firm of each country (Ongena and Smith, 
2000). In Italy the median firm reports twelve banking relationships. In Portugal 
the median firms uses ten banks, in France nine, and in Belgium and Spain seven. 
The median Swedish and Norwegian firms report relationships, on average, with 
two banks. Our results provide evidence for firms in countries with a relatively  
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large number of banking relationships, which is not uncommon in Europe. 
Second, almost 75 per cent of our sample consists of firms with no more than 50 
employees. This predominance of smaller firms in our sample makes it possible to 
test the effect of the number of banks on small firms’ performance. Third, most of 
the firms are not listed on a stock exchange. Fourth, the relationship lending we 
analyse is related to the geographical proximity of the bank and the firm. 
  The evidence reveals that the number of relationships does affect firms’ 
performance, with performance measured by five different proxies generally 
declining as the number of relationships increases. This inverse relationship 
between performance and the number of banking relationships is stronger for 
smaller firms. The results also show that financing cost – measured by interest 
expense over assets – increases as the number of relationships increases. These 
findings are consistent with the positive value of fewer bank relationships – lower 
information asymmetries and less costly agency problems – outweighing hold-up 
problems associated with having fewer relationships. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature and describes the Italian banking industry. 
Section 3 describes the data, the empirical specification and presents the 
estimates. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2 Background  literature 
2.1 Theory 
Part of the literature on the value of a close relationship between a firm and a bank 
is premised on observations by Fama (1985) and James (1987) that, compared to 
other forms of financing, bank loans to firms are based on less widely available 
information. The relationship between a firm and a bank can help to overcome 
information asymmetries and agency problems that create liquidity constraints 
which can reduce firms’ investment (Fazzari et al, 1988; Hoshi et al, 1991; 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
  These theories suggest that screening and monitoring by banks can overcome 
information and incentive problems and reduce liquidity constraints for borrowers 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Bhattacharya 
and Thakor, 1993). A bank relationship – a continuing contact between the 
financial institution and the firm for the provision of financial services beyond 
simple, anonymous transactions – is associated with the collection of information 
that can be used to make decisions about the evolution of the contract terms 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). On the other hand, banks could disseminate, 
accidentally or on purpose, confidential information to firms’ competitors, and  
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borrowing firms may need to consider negative effects of such dissemination of 
confidential information.
1 
  Given these preliminary considerations, the main issue that arises is the 
potential benefit of this relationship for the borrower and the bank. This benefit 
has to be evaluated taking into account the influence of external factors such as 
the competitiveness of the environment, the degree of technological diffusion and 
the level of financial market development. 
  Theoretical analyses suggest that a close relationship between a bank and a 
firm can reduce information asymmetries, improve the firm’s access to credit and 
lead to an overall improvement in the firm’s performance. Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1983) show that the threat of future credit rationing can reduce moral hazard. 
Diamond (1991) shows that reputation building through bank borrowing can 
provide certification, which can allow a firm to eventually raise funds on public 
markets. This benefit of a successful bank relationship raises the cost of default on 
a bank loan and lowers the equilibrium probability of default. A bank relationship 
also can reduce agency problems because the risk of a reduction in the amount of 
bank loans is an incentive for managers to pursue less risky projects (Rajan, 
1992).
2 On the same line, von Thadden (1995) shows that the efficiency of 
investment is improved by a debt contract with periodic monitoring. Moreover, 
borrowing from banks allows firms to keep information confidential, not requiring 
the widespread disclosure typical of others sources of financing.
3 
  This line of argument suggests that a closer bank relationship will be 
associated with better firm performance and that a small firm’s optimal strategy is 
to establish a long-term relationship and to borrow from one or perhaps a limited 
number of banks. The empirical observation of multiple, time-varying 
relationships, however, led economists to consider other factors. 
  If a bank and a firm have a long-term relationship, the bank can acquire a 
great deal of unique information about a firm and the bank may be able to exploit 
this, a problem which is called a hold-up problem in game theory. Various 
theoretical contributions emphasise the information-capture problems and the 
presence of fixed costs associated with the search for a new bank. On the one side, 
Sharpe (1990) suggests that long-lasting bank and firm relationships arise because 
high quality firms are ‘informationally captured’, meaning that the firms are 
unable to convey information about their quality to other banks. On the other side, 
Blackwell and Santomero (1982) highlight the inertia linked to search costs borne 
by a firm looking for a new source of funds. In a repeated game with moral hazard 
                                                 
1 Rheinbaben and Ruckers (2004) show that the number of bank relationships can increase with a 
firm’s age and size. 
2 Boot and Thakor (1994) examine optimal contract design in a model in which banks provide 
firms with contracts that require high initial collateral combined with interest payments that fall 
when the bank has verified the successful completion of financed projects. 
3 This is particularly important for innovating and R&D-investing firms, as highlighted by Yosha 
(1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995).  
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and adverse selection, Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that the reduction of the 
interest rate due to information acquired about the borrower is limited in more 
concentrated credit markets, and motivate this result by arguing that these markets 
are characterised by more severe hold-up problems. Von Thadden (1998) shows 
that a single bank with better information about a firm can impose hold-up costs 
that can adversely affect the borrowers’ value. These additional costs can be 
lessened or eliminated by multiple banking relationships. 
  The duration of a relationship between a firm and a bank also plays a role. 
Greenbaum et al (1989) present a model that includes search costs for firms 
looking for new banks and show that the borrowing rate is a non-decreasing 
function of the duration of the credit relationship and that the probability that a 
firm will terminate a relationship is positively associated with its duration. 
Longhofer and Santos (2000) demonstrate how during a recession firms that have 
ongoing relationships with a bank are better able to obtain additional financing, 
allowing them to weather the recession with minimal loss. 
  These effects of relationships between banks and firms are likely to be more 
important for relatively small firms, because small firm have a higher cost – often 
prohibitively higher – of obtaining investment funds from financial markets and 
rely heavily on banks as primary credit sources. Small firms tend to borrow from 
banks and to borrow from a few banks with which they have a long-term 
relationship. These relationships are an important feature of small business 
lending. As noted by Berger and Udell (1998), perhaps the most important 
characteristic defining small business finance is informational opacity: small firms 
usually do not enter into contracts that are publicly visible, do not have audited 
financial statements and consequently can have difficulty building reputations to 
signal high quality. Since there may be little public information available on small 
firms, relationship lending enables banks to collect private information on the 
credit-worthiness of these firms (Strahan and Weston, 1998). These factors 
suggest that relationship lending may be particularly beneficial to small firms, 
including lower cost or greater availability of credit, protection against credit 
crunches, and the provision of implicit interest rate or credit risk insurance. 
  On the other side, for a small firm with a single relationship, an interruption 
of the credit line from the bank can be interpreted as a bad signal about the firm 
even if the withdrawal of the credit is not linked to financial distress of the small 
business but others are uncertain about the reason for the credit withdrawal. As a 
result, small firms can have multiple banking relationships, which have higher 





2.2 Empirical  literature 
Although the empirical implication of recent theoretical models seems to be in 
favour of single versus multiple relationships lending, we have shown in the 
previous section how the value of a single and close bank firm relationship 
remains unclear. A brief review of the empirical literature adds complexity to the 
issue by highlighting contrasting results. 
  Studies of financial markets’ responses to announcements of bank loans 
usually indicate a positive effect of new bank loans on firms’ values (Slovin, 
Johnson and Glascock, 1992; Best and Zhang, 1993; Shockley and Thakor, 1998). 
Analysis of bank lending behaviour focused on banks’ liabilities suggests that, 
thanks to their access to core deposits, banks can protect themselves from 
exogenous shocks and consequently insulate long-term borrowers from exogenous 
credit shocks (Berlin and Mester, 1999). 
  There are exceptions. For example, Kang and Stulz’s (2000) results for a 
sample of Japanese firms indicate better performance for firms not financed by 
banks compared to firms with high shares of bank debt. 
  Empirical evidence on the effects of single versus multiple banking 
relationships on firms’ performance is mixed. Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri 
(1998), studying a sample of small Italian firms, find evidence that liquidity 
constraints are relatively less frequent for firms borrowing from a limited number 
of banks, with a resulting positive impact on firms’ performance. Petersen and 
Rajan (1994) find that multiple bank relationships are associated with higher 
interest payments and more credit constraints. Using a data set on Norwegian 
publicly listed firms, Degryse and Ongena (2001) find a negative two-way 
correspondence between the number of relationships and sales profitability and 
also find that firms deciding to switch from single to multiple relationships are on 
average smaller and younger than firms choosing not to switch. Fok, Chang and 
Lee (2004) apply the Degryse and Ongena methodology to a sample of Taiwanese 
firms and find a negative link between firms’ performance and the number of 
bank relationships, consistent with Degryse and Ongena’s results. 
  Harhoff and Korting (1998) and Cole (1998) report increasing limits to credit 
access for firms borrowing from more than one bank. In sharp contrast with these 
findings, Houston and James (1995, 1996) find a negative correlation between 
firm’s reliance on one bank and growth potential plus evidence that firms with 
one banking relationship also face more credit constraints than those with multiple 
relationships. Detragiache et al (2000) suggest that multiple banking relationships 
can diversify liquidity risk. By empirically testing a model of the optimal number 
of bank relationships, they find that multiple bank relationships decrease the 
probability of an interruption of funding due to a lender’s internal problems. 
Forestieri and Tirri (2002), studying the relationships between Italian firms and  
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banks, find that the costs associated with a single long-lasting relationship are 
higher than the corresponding benefits. 
  Turning to the empirical literature that investigates the impact of bank 
relationship on small firms’ performance, data for the United States, Japan and 
almost all European Union (EU) countries indicate that small firms tend to borrow 
from fewer banks than large firms (Ongena and Smith, 2000). This is in line with 
theoretical models which suggest that relationship lending can have a number of 
benefits for small firms including lower cost or greater availability of credit due to 
efficient gathering of information, protection against credit crunches and 
provision of implicit interest rate or credit risk insurance (Berger and Udell, 
1998). 
  Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) find that Argentinean firms tend to borrow 
from more than one bank when their primary bank is financially distressed and 
that smaller firms prefer exclusive lending relationships. Based on US data, 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that small and young firms tend to be less credit 
constrained and to receive better lending rates when they borrow from only one 
bank. This result is stronger in more concentrated credit markets, suggesting that 
small borrowers may be worse off with competition among banks. Cole’s (1998) 
evidence indicates that the existence of a single bank relationship increases the 
probability of extension of credit for small businesses in the US. 
  Ongena and Smith (2001) in their study of publicly traded Norwegian firms 
find that the probability of ending a bank relationship increases over time, 
suggesting a corresponding decrease in the value of the relationship. Surprisingly, 
the shortest relationships are those of young, small and highly leveraged 
borrowers that usually are considered to be highly dependent on bank financing. 
These effects altogether lead to a conclusion that firms do not seem to become 
locked into bank relationships, which could be interpreted as raising some doubt 
about the value of bank relationships. 
  Some more general results suggest that long-term relationships improve credit 
access by reducing both funding costs (Berger and Udell, 1995; Elsas and 
Krahnen, 1998) and collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and 
Korting, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Berlin and Mester (1997) show 
how loan-rate smoothing in response to interest-rate shocks is part of an optimal 
long-term contract between a bank and a firm. 
  De Bodt, Lobez and Statnik (2005), using Belgian data, highlight that there is 
no unique strategy for a small firm’s choice of the optimal number of banking 
relationships. This choice instead depends on two factors: characteristics of the 
main bank, namely whether it is small or large and local or national; and the 
degree of opacity that characterizes the small firm. 
  More recently, Iannotta and Navone (2008) examine the effect of a banking 
relationship on bond underwriting fees in about 2,200 bond issues completed by 
European firms from 1993 to 2003. They find that a strong relationship between  
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an issuer and the issuer’s main bank reduces underwriting fees, a result consistent 




2.3  The Italian banking industry 
During the last 20 years, Italian banking has gone through a process of 
consolidation common to all European banking systems. Although this process 
has led to an overall improvement of the sector’s efficiency, the system still has 
some unique aspects. Italian banks have been isolated simply due Italy’s higher 
protective regulations. Most of the banks have reacted to the sharper competition 
by cutting costs and expanding in size, often by merging with competitors. While 
the 1990s experienced a large number of mergers creating a few large regional 
institutions, as well as national banks, smaller local banks still dominate local 
deposit markets. While these consolidations decreased the number of banking 
institutions, the deregulation of branching activities increased the number of bank 
branches by almost 75 per cent. 
  Focusing on the period considered in our empirical estimates, as Table 1 
shows, the number of Italian banks decreased from 921 in 1998 to 841 in 2000 
while the number of branches increased from 26258 to 28177 respectively. During 
the same period there were 176 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which 
transferred 33.4 per cent of total intermediated funds.
5 There were 85 banking 
groups at the beginning of 1998 and 74 at the end of 2000. After this wave of 
M&As, market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl – Hirschmann Index 
fell from 210 to 190. 
  The consolidation process has not changed the main characteristic of the 
relationship between Italian banks and firms, which continues to be mainly based 
on their geographical proximity. 
  The importance of proximity is the main reason why so many local banks 
survived the consolidation process and big banks continue to maintain many 
branches scattered all over the nation. The national banks have been able to 
exploit scale economies without eliminating the relatively small local banks which 
have maintained their substantial role in financing firms. This coexistence is 
similar to the continued existence of community banks in the US after the 
adoption of the Riegle-Neal Act which permits banks to have branches across 
state boundaries (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003; De Young, Hasan and Kirchhoff, 
1997). 
                                                 
4 The strength of a banking relationship is measured by the repeated use of the main bank in 
similar transactions. 
5 M&As between banks already belonging to the same group are not included.  
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  This type of banking structure can have consequences for lending 
relationships. As Brickley, Linck and Smith (2003) suggest, small locally owned 
banks can have a comparative advantage over large banks in specific 
environments. On the same line of reasoning, Hein, Koch and MacDonald (2005) 
note that banks are not homogeneous financial intermediaries and, in the US, 
small community banks operate very differently from large banks. While 
community banks generally emphasize relationship banking, large banks rely on 
transactional banking in which they provide highly standardized services based on 
readily available, quantifiable information with little human input. 
  Data limitations restrict our ability to control for differences in lenders but, as 
highlighted in the description above, the Italian banking system still is mainly 
focused on relationship banking. Such banking and lending relationships involve 
the use of soft information, not easily available and quantifiable. Such information 
requires human input and evaluation and is acquired mainly by working one-on-
one with the banking customer. 
 
 
3 Empirical  analysis 
3.1 Sample 
The data in this paper are from the Capitalia Survey, which is one of the most 
important qualitative and quantitative information sources on Italian firms. The 
survey has been conducted to create a sample of 4,680 Italian manufacturer firms 
which have ten or more employees.
6 The sample has been stratified by size classes 
based on the number of employees, geographical areas – North-East, North-West, 
Central Regions, South and Isles – and sectors – the Pavitt classification (Pavitt 
1984) – with each strata obtained using the Neyman formula with value added per 
employee as a stratifying factor.
7 Balance sheet and income statement data are 
from the CERVED database which collects information from the Italian Chamber 
of Commerce. Qualitative data are obtained from questionnaires answered by a 
representative of each firm and then checked for inconsistencies. The years 
included in our sample are 1998, 1999 and 2000. 
  From the total sample, we select firms for which complete balance sheets and 
income statements are available. We select firms with positive values of total 
                                                 
6 Manufacturing is the main contributor to Italian GDP and loans financing fixed investment are 
the underlying objects of the bank relationships examined in this paper. 
7 The size classes are 11–20, 21–50, 51–250, 251–500, and more than 500. The macroareas are 
North East (Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna), North West 
(Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia and Liguria), Central (Toscana, Umbria, Marche and Lazio), 
and South and Isles (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and 
Sardegna). The sectors are scale Economies, specialised, traditional, and high technology.  
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assets, net worth and net sales. In order to eliminate the influence of extreme 
values, we discard observations according to the following rules: 1. return on 
equity (ROE) greater than 100 per cent or lower than -20 per cent; 2. return on 
assets (ROA) greater than 30 per cent or lower than -20 per cent; 3. ratio of total 
sales to total assets greater than 300 per cent or less than 20 per cent; or 4. number 
of bank relationships greater than 50. The result is an unbalanced sample 
including 3,566 firms for 1998, 3,601 firms for 1999 and 3,597 firms for 2000, 
with a total of 10,764 firm-year observations. 
  Table 2 shows the classification of the firms across industries as measured by 
the ATECO 1998 code. Within the manufacturing sector, the firms belong mostly 
to Food, beverage and tobacco (9 per cent), Textile knitwear and clothing (12.5 
per cent), Wood and wooden furniture (8.5 per cent), Metal products (15 per cent) 
and Mechanical equipment (9 per cent).
8 
  In order to investigate differential effects linked to firm size, we divide the 
full sample into size classes based on the number of employees. Small firms (10 
to 50 employees) are 76.5 per cent of the total sample; medium firms (51 to 250 
employees) are 17.2 per cent of the total; and large firms (greater than 250 
employees) are 6.3 per cent of the total. 
  The large number of small firms stands out clearly from the comparison of 
means and medians in Table 2, which is consistent with one of the main 
characteristics of Italian industry – the relatively small size of firms compared to 
other countries. Descriptive statistics on the firms’ ages show that average age 
ranges from 19 to 33 years across sectors with the oldest firms belonging to the 
food, beverage and tobacco sector. 
  Information on the number and duration of bank relationships is based on the 
firms’ answers to questions on ‘the number of banks with which they had 
commercial relationships at the end of (for example) 2000’ and ‘the number of 
years for which a bank has been their main lender’. We are explicitly considering 
only bank loans and not other types of credit such as trade credit. During the 
period considered, 4 per cent of the firms say that they have a single bank 
relationship, 63 per cent have two to five bank relationships, and the remaining 33 
per cent have six or more bank relationships. By size class, relatively more small 
firms have relationships than do medium and large firms (4.7, 1.0 and 1.3 per cent 
respectively). Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 3. 
  On average, small firms are younger than medium and large firms and have 
somewhat shorter relationships with banks. All three age classes of firms report 
                                                 
8 The ATECO 1998 classification corresponds to NACE rev. 1.1. The manufacturing sector 
(section D) covers the following industries: 1. Food, beverage and tobacco; 2. Textile, knitwear 
and clothing; 3. Leather and shoes; 4. Wood and wooden furniture; 5. Paper and printing; 6. 
Chemicals; 7. Rubber and plastics; 8. Glass and ceramics; 9. Construction materials; 10. Metal 
extractions; 11. Metal products; 12. Mechanical materials; 13. Mechanical equipment; 14. 
Electronics; 15. Electrical equipment; 16. Precision instruments and apparel; 17 Vehicles and 
vehicle components; 18. Other transports; 19. Energy; and 20. Other manufacturing.  
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quite long average durations of main relationships – 17 years for small firms and 
almost 19 years for medium and large firms. Nine out of ten firms have 
relationships that last more than five years. 
  As proxies for firms’ performance, we use five different ratios: ROA, ROE, 
interest expense over assets, non-interest expense over assets, and sales over 
assets. Details on the calculation of these variables are included in Appendix 1. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics on these performance measures broken down 
by firm size. Table 4 suggests that small firms have relatively better performance 
than the average as measured by all performance variables except ROA. 
  Tables 5 and 6 present summary statistics on the performance measures 
broken down by size and number of bank relationships and by size and duration of 
the main relationship. For this summary, we divide the number of bank 
relationships and the duration of the main relationship into three groups (in table 
5, bank relationships are grouped into single relationships, 2 to 5 relationships, 
more than 5 relationships; in table 6, the duration of the main relationship is 
grouped into 1 to 2 years, 3 to 5 years, more than 5 years). Table 5 shows lower 
values of all performance indicators as the number of bank relationships increases 
both for the total sample and for small firms. This relation fades when considering 
medium and large firms. For medium firms, we find lower interest expense over 
assets always is associated with a single relationship, while evidence on other 
variables is mixed. The same happens for large firms. Table 6 highlights how the 
cost of credit is higher at the beginning of the relationship for small and medium 
firms but not for large firms and how performance as measured by ROA increases 
with the duration of the relationship. 
  One reason why the Capitalia Sample is particularly interesting is that it 
captures lending relationships not captured by the Central Credit Register (CCR).
9 
The CCR in fact, collects information on individual firms asking for credit from 
banks above the threshold of 150 million liras or approximately 75,000 dollars in 
1998. The bank-firm relationships captured by our sample instead are mostly 
smaller as indicated by the per centiles reported in table 7. Even if the average 
debt of firms is about 1,929.5 million liras in the short term, 40 per cent of the 
firms declare zero bank debt. This is particularly true for small firms which have 
an average bank debt of 1,872.5 million liras in the short run. This means that 
almost 50 per cent of our sample is below the threshold of the CCR. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The Central Credit Register is a databank coordinated by the Bank of Italy, which collects 
information from all banks on individual borrowers. It is one of the most reliable and complete 
data sets on Italian lending relationships.  
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3.2 Estimated  relationships 
Because we have a relatively large number of observations, we initially estimate 
an unrestricted relationship between the number of banks and the performance 
variables. We then focus on a simple relationship that captures the features of the 
unrestricted relationship. 
  The first step is the specification of regressions with each of the performance 
measures as a left-hand-side variable 
 
ε + δ + γ + β + β +
















year ind 2 age ln_ age ln_
size ln_ 2 dur ln_ dur ln_ bank DepVar
 (3.1) 
 
In equation (3.1) we model the number of banks using dummy variables, bankh, 
equal to 1, 2, 3,…, 20 if the firm has 1, 2, 3, …., 20 bank relationships. The 
intercept reflects the constant term for firms with 21 or more relationships. The 
left-hand-side variable DepVar is in turn ROA, ROE, interest expense over assets, 
non-interest expense over assets and sales relative to assets; ln_dur is the 
logarithm of the duration of the main relationship, ln_dur2 is the square of ln_dur, 
ln_size is the logarithm of the size of the firm in terms of net sales, ln_age is the 
logarithm of the age of the firm, ln_age2 is the square of ln_age, indi is a set of 
dummy variables to adjust for industries and yeari is a set of dummy variables for 
the years.
10 Duration is included because a bank relationship can be more 
specifically defined along two dimensions: time and scope (Ongena and Smith, 
2000). Duration is an observable measure of the strength of a bank relationship. 
The longer the relationship between a firm and a bank, the more valuable this 
relationship is and the less the firm’s incentive to initiate an additional 
relationship (Farinha and Santos, 2002). Age is included because it is likely to 
affect loan rates, with older firms receiving more favourable terms (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Ongena and Smith, 2000). Moreover, if building relationships takes 
time, multiple banking relationships can be positively correlated with the number 
of relationships (Detragiache et al, 2000). This regression is estimated for the total 
sample and for the sub-samples of small, medium and large firms.
11 
  While ordinary least squares would not be appropriate for estimating the 
effects of arbitrary changes in the number of bank relationships, this estimation 
strategy is fine for estimating the projection of the performance variables on the 
number of banks and for inferring the linear relationship between the performance 
                                                 
10 The details on the calculation of the variables are reported in Appendix 1. 
11 The results are reported in Appendix 2.  
18 
variables and the number of relationships.
12 We stress that we are looking at 
projections and not at structural equations. The question we are answering is: 
‘Conditional on the actual number of relationships, what is the firm’s 
performance?’ and not ‘For arbitrary numbers of relationships, what is the firm’s 
performance?’ In other words, we are not trying to predict the effect of a firm 
changing the number of its relationships for some reason; we are predicting the 
performance based on the number of relationships that the firm has. These 
regressions estimate exactly that conditional relationship. 
  Previous theoretical and empirical work on the same issue focusing both on 
Italy and on other countries has considered the number of relationships to be an 
endogenous variable (eg Detragiache et al, 2000). Although our question is a bit 
different as highlighted in the previous paragraph, we have taken into account the 
endogeneity issue performing instrumental-variable estimation using the Lewbel 
methodology (Lewbel, 1997) and performing simultaneous-equation estimation 
(Alfò and Trovato, 2006). The results are in line with those presented and are 
available upon request. 
  We then estimate a restricted equation (3.2) in which the number of bank 
relationships is represented by a second-order polynomial.
13 The equation with a 
second-order polynomial is 
 
ε + δ + γ + β + β + β +









i 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
year ind 2 age ln_ age ln_ size ln_
2 dur ln_ dur ln_ 2 bank ln_ bank ln_ DepVar
 (3.2) 
 
where, ln_bank is the logarithm of the number of banks and ln_bank2 is the 
square of the logarithm of the number of banks.
14 
  Table 8 reports the results of F-tests to test restricting the general regression 
with dummies (3.1) to the regression with a second-order polynomial (3.2) for 
each of the performance variables. The p-values provide mixed evidence, with the 
number of banks in some instances seeming not to be well summarised by a 
second-order polynomial function of the number of banks. On the other hand, 
given the large number of observations, it is possible that these differences are 
statistically but not economically significant. 
  To examine economic significance, we plot the values of the implied 
performance variables by number of banks in Figures 1 to 4 for all banks and for 
                                                 
12 For example, the variation in the number of relationships in our data seldom if ever is due to 
liquidity problems at banks. Ordinary least squares would provide a consistent estimator of the 
effect of such liquidity problems only if the effect of such problems on the number of relationships 
and performance were the same as the estimated relationship due to other factors. 
13 Estimation with the number of banks and with the natural logarithm of number of banks 
indicated that the natural logarithm fits better. 
14 We decided which control variables to include in our estimations after checking several different 
specifications and testing for possible correlation and misspecification problems.  
19 
the three size classes. The graphs in these figures, each of which shows the 
coefficients of the dummy variables and the values implied by the second-order 
polynomial, make it possible to examine the differences between the two 
estimated relationships and decide on the economic significance of deviations 
from the restricted equation. The polynomial is a reasonably close approximation 
for about ten or fewer bank relationships. The dummy variables estimate a more 
erratic relationship between the performance variables and the number of 
relationships as the number of relationships increases. This is not surprising, given 
that most of the banks have five or fewer relationships and as few as three firms 
underlie the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables at higher numbers of 
relationships. For example, there are only three small firms with 20 bank 
relationships. This relative paucity of underlying data suggests putting less weight 
on the point estimate of the coefficient shown in Figure 2 for 20 relationships than 
on the coefficients based on more observations. 
  Overall, we conclude that the simple nonlinear function well approximates the 
more general estimated relationship and focus on those results. The p-values are 
mixed, but the estimated effects for the numbers of relationships are quite similar 
for numbers of relationships with many observations. The figures show generally 
consistent results for the small firms, which are the largest part of the sample of 
all firms. ROA and ROE generally decline with the number of relationships, 
interest expense over assets generally increases, non-interest expense over assets 
shows some evidence of decreasing as the number of relationships increases and 
sales over assets decrease. 
  Table 9 reports the regressions including the logarithm of the number of 
banks linearly and squared.
15 F-statistics indicate that the estimated coefficients of 
the number of banks are statistically significant for all regressions for small and 
medium firms at any usual significance level. The F-statistics indicate that, even 
for the largest firms, the number of banks is statistically significant at the five per 
cent significance level for ROA and interest expense over assets, and at the 5.2 
per cent level for ROE. Figures 1 through 4 show that these statistically 
significant relationships generally are economically significant as well, with the 
relationships most marked for small firms and hardly apparent for large firms. 
These figures also show that a larger number of bank relationships is associated 
with lower ROA and ROE, higher interest expense over assets, lower non-interest 
expense over assets and lower sales over assets. These results support the 
hypothesis that better performing firms are more likely to have a smaller number 
of bank relationships than more poorly performing firms. This indicates that the 
benefits of fewer relationships in terms of reduction of information asymmetries 
and agency problems outweigh the negative effects connected to hold-up 
problems. The clear negative relationship between firms’ performance and the 
                                                 
15 The unrestricted regressions with dummy variables are reported in Appendix 2.  
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number of bank relationships for small firms also suggests how multiple bank 
relationships are associated with worse performance by small firms. Due to the 
heavy reliance of this group of firms on bank credit, the lower cost or the greater 
availability of credit due to efficient gathering of information derived from a close 
relationship acquires a great importance. 
  F-statistics also indicate that the duration of the main relationship is important 
for these performance variables, as is the age of the firm. Although our results do 
not show a clear path of the interaction between duration, age and firms’ 
performance, the values of the F-statistics suggest that these measures add 
important elements in explaining the relationship between number of bank 
relationships and firms’ performances, which is the main task of this paper. The 
duration of the lending relationship and the age of the firm become measures of 
the information generated over time that represent the possibility for the bank to 
gain private information about the borrower and the risk for the latter to be locked 
in that relationship. 
  This interpretation of our results is strengthened by the fact that, as 
highlighted in paragraph 2.3, the Italian banking system is mostly based on local 
bank and small firm relationships. One of the consequences of this kind of 
structure is that neither small nor large banks usually give credit without the 
provision of adequate collateral, particularly for small firms even those with good 
projects and good profit expectations. The credit-risk evaluation mostly is based 
on the collateral instead of the firm’s history, future projects and the expected 
return on the investment proposed. This creates particular mechanisms for 
accessing credit. The firm’s owner usually uses personal belongings as collateral. 
That is why most firms maintain relationships with more than one bank and is in 
line with the fact that only 4% of the firms report single relationships. In 
summary, firms with poor prospects are unable to maintain a single banking 
relationship and therefore seek out multiple relationships; their choice is partly 




Based on data for Italian manufacturing firms, this paper investigates the effect on 
firms’ performance of their financing strategy in terms of the number of lenders. 
This includes an analysis of possible differential effects related to firms’ sizes. 
The sample has three distinctive features compared to data used in prior studies: 1. 
five per cent of the firms have a single bank relationship and 66 per cent report 
two to five relationships; 2. about 75 per cent of the firms are small with no more 
than 50 workers; and 3. about 99 per cent of the firms are not listed on a stock 
exchange.  
21 
  We find that a firm’s performance measured by return on assets and return on 
equity decreases as the number of bank relationships increases. This negative 
association between a firm’s performance and the number of relationships is 
stronger for small firms. We also find that interest expense over assets increases 
with the number of relationships, which may indicate a higher interest rate or 
more borrowing. This estimated negative association between the number of bank 
relationships and a firm’s performance strengthens similar findings in other 
countries (Degryse and Ongena, 2001 and Fok, Chang and Lee, 2004). 
Additionally, the results are consistent with the positive value of fewer bank 
relationships in reducing information asymmetries and agency problems, where 
these positive effects outweigh hold-up problems.  
22 
Tables 
Table 1.   Statistics on the Italian banking system 
 
Statistics for the Italian banking system on 1. the number of banks, 2. the number of 
branches, 3. the number of groups, 4. the number of banks belonging to a group, and 5. 
the market share of 5 bigger groups, 6. the market share of 10 bigger groups, and 7. the 
Herfindahl Hirshmann Index which is the sum of the squares of all the credit institutions’ 
market shares based on total assets with a scale from zero with an infinite number of 

























1998 921 26258  85  200  42%  58%  210 
1999 876 27134  79  208  50%  63%  220 
2000 841 28177  74  217  54%  67%  190 




Table 2.   Sample distribution across industries 
 
Descriptive statistics of the Capitalia Sample on the 1. percentage of firms belonging to 
an industry, 2. size measured as the number of employees working in the firm, and 3. age 
measured by the number of years the firm exists. 
 
    Size (n. of employees)    Age (years) 















and tobacco  8.8  5  57.36 24  122.29 1221   1 33.48  29  25.08 147
Textile, knitwear 
and clothing  12.4  3  80.88 26  159.35 1279  1 24.32  19  20.26 171
Leather and shoes  4.5  11  45.28 28 55.56 428  1 19.90  16  13.34 77
Wood and 
wooden furniture  8.5  10  48.64 25  71.14 650   1 22.73  19  22.25 312
Paper and printing  6.0  8  47.75 20  98.53 863   1 26.15  21  19.69 141
Chemicals 4.1  10  109.33 25  253.85 1955   1 30.05  24  23.15 182
Rubber and 
plastics 5.2  10  69.32 26  177.58 2250   1 21.57  19  13.97 95
Glass and 
ceramics 1.9  10  212.11 31  530.49 3600   1 26.03  22  22.23 137
Construction 
materials 4.1  8  42.56 21.5  74.52 650  3 24.65  23  14.22 119
Metal extractions  1.8  9  145.53 35  360.17 2886   1 26.09  22  16.32 71
Metal products  15.0  7  45.18 23  74.85 650  2 22.53  20  14.83 162
Mechanical 
materials 2.8  12  122.12 44.5  184.85 1130  2 25.38  23  15.22 94
Mechanical 
equipment 8.7  9  63.33 29  126.60 1715  2 25.03  21  16.83 116
Electronics 4.5  7  153.34 29  758.48 8625   1 19.66  18  11.94 61
Electrical 
equipment 0.5  13  291.48 64.5  856.43 3800  2 21.10  20.5  10.92 42
Precision 
instruments and 
apparel 1.1  12  149.03 32  483.24 3322  4 25.48  21  17.40 74
Vehicles and 
vehicle 
components 2.1  12  190.60 37  384.74 2132  1 23.47  19.5  17.04 103
Other transports  0.7  11  156.10 25.5 373.81 1760   2 26.54  21.5 16.77 70
Energy 0.2  14  23.52 16  18.91 73   6 19.12  18  7.43 32
Other 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8.   p-values of the F statistics on the significance 
     of  restrictions 
 
This table reports the results of F-tests to test restriction of the general regression with 
dummies, equation (3.1) in section 3.2, to the regression with a second-order polynomial, 
equation (3.2) in section 3.2, for each of the performance variables. The performance 
variables are 1. ROA, the ratio of net earnings to total assets, 2. ROE, the ratio of net 
earnings to net worth, 3. interest over assets, the ratio of interest expense to total assets, 4. 
non-interest over assets, the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets, and 5. sales over 
assets, the ratio of net sales to total assets. The size classes are 1. small (from 1 to 50 
employees), 2. medium (from 51 to 250 employees) and 3. large (greater than 250 
employees). “Num DF” is the numerator degrees of freedom and “Den DF” is the 
denominator degrees of freedom. 
 














All 0.018  0.316  <0.001  0.024  0.005  18  9949 
Small 0.02  0.243  <0.001  0.969  0.015  18  7733 
Medium 0.077 0.034  0.321 <0.001 <0.01  18  1663 




Table 9.   Estimated OLS Regressions 
 
Dependent variables are the five performance indicators: 1. ROA, the ratio of net earnings 
to total assets; 2. ROE, the ratio of net earnings to net worth; 3. interest over assets, the 
ratio of interest expense to total assets, 4. non-interest over assets, the ratio of non-interest 
expense to total assets, and 5. sales over assets, the ratio of net sales to total assets. All 
variables are in percentage terms. The size classes are 1. small (from 1 to 50 employees), 
2. medium (from 51 to 250 employees) and 3. large (greater than 250 employees). In 
addition to the coefficients reported, each regression also includes 19 industries dummies 
(see footnote 8) and two for 1998 and 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
second part of the table reports p-values of F-tests performed comparing equation (3.2) 
with in turn: 1. the same specification without the bank variables, 2. the same 
specification without the duration variables; 3. the same specification without the age 
variables. 
 
 All  Firms 






ln_bank -0.983  -0.141  0.940  0.146  4.463 
 (0.232)**  (0.841)  (0.101)**  (1.463)  (2.518) 
ln_bank2 -0.263  -1.254  0.025  -0.911  -4.810 
 (0.079)**  (0.286)**  (0.034)  (0.498)  (0.857)** 
ln_dur 0.209  -0.890  -0.197  9.275  18.591 
 (0.297)  (1.079)  (0.130)  (1.877)**  (3.230)** 
ln_dur2 -0.015  0.246  0.027  -1.578  -2.960 
 (0.060)  (0.217)  (0.026)  (0.378)**  (0.650)** 
ln_size 0.858  2.077  -0.362  -3.931  3.145 
 (0.048)**  (0.173)**  (0.021)**  (0.302)**  (0.519)** 
ln_age 0.766  -6.881  0.112  -4.648  -4.647 
 (0.320)*  (1.161)**  (0.140)  (2.019)*  (3.474) 
ln_age2 -0.169  0.678  -0.058  0.419  -0.847 
 (0.056)**  (0.204)**  (0.025)*  (0.354)  (0.610) 
Observations 9996 9996  9996  9996  9996 
R-squared 0.075  0.056  0.105  0.159  0.077 
F-test degrees of freedom (2,9967)       
(1) no bank  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(2) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(3) no age  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
* significant at 5 per cent level; ** significant at 1 per cent level 
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 Small  Firms 






ln_bank -1.047  -0.443  0.845  3.723  4.667 
 (0.290)**  (1.065)  (0.119)**  (1.884)*  (3.168) 
ln_bank2 -0.365  -1.426  0.119  -2.484  -6.405 
 (0.109)**  (0.402)**  (0.045)**  (0.712)**  (1.197)** 
ln_dur 0.048  -0.647  0.061  12.368  23.275 
 (0.355)  (1.304)  (0.146)  (2.307)**  (3.880)** 
ln_dur2 0.006  0.237  -0.025  -2.093  -3.912 
 (0.072)  (0.264)  (0.030)  (0.468)**  (0.787)** 
ln_size 1.601  4.465  -0.517  -4.514  15.959 
 (0.083)**  (0.304)**  (0.034)**  (0.538)**  (0.905)** 
ln_age 0.623  -8.678  0.094  -6.144  -9.511 
 (0.373)  (1.372)**  (0.154)  (2.428)*  (4.083)* 
ln_age2 -0.134  0.948  -0.048  0.593  -0.055 
 (0.067)*  (0.245)**  (0.027)  (0.434)  (0.729) 
Observations 7778 7778  7778  7778  7778 
R-squared 0.089  0.069  0.132  0.158  0.106 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,7749)     
(1) no bank  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(2) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(3) no age  0.063  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
*significant at 5 per cent level; ** significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
 Medium  Firms 






ln_bank 0.727  1.112  0.559  5.017  15.201 
 (0.701)  (2.457)  (0.410)  (4.100)  (7.073)* 
ln_bank2 -0.682  -1.561  0.101  -2.093  -6.649 
 (0.204)**  (0.715)*  (0.119)  (1.193)  (2.057)** 
ln_dur 0.637  -0.608  -0.743  5.668  18.376 
 (0.684)  (2.400)  (0.400)  (4.004)  (6.908)** 
ln_dur2 -0.070  0.145  0.148  -1.121  -2.765 
 (0.134)  (0.468)  (0.078)  (0.782)  (1.348)* 
ln_size 1.199  3.098  -0.243  -7.229  7.268 
 (0.136)**  (0.476)**  (0.079)**  (0.794)**  (1.370)** 
ln_age -0.128  -5.133  0.084  -8.556  -3.862 
 (0.781)  (2.739)  (0.457)  (4.570)  (7.883) 
ln_age2 -0.059  0.472  -0.056  1.181  -0.057 
 (0.131)  (0.458)  (0.076)  (0.765)  (1.319) 
Observations 1709 1709  1709  1709  1709 
R-squared 0.156  0.115  0.066  0.191  0.103 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,1680)     
(1) no bank  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(2) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(3) no age  0.012  <0.001  0.025  0.064  0.034 
*significant at 5 per cent level; ** significant at 1 per cent level. 
  
33 
 Large  Firms 






ln_bank 0.412  2.296  0.673  -7.349  -10.896 
 (1.092)  (3.651)  (0.421)  (4.634)  (9.046) 
ln_bank2 -0.296  -1.110  -0.076  1.327  2.036 
 (0.268)  (0.896)  (0.103)  (1.137)  (2.219) 
ln_dur 0.712  -2.711  -0.885  -0.266  -9.507 
 (0.796)  (2.661)  (0.307)**  (3.377)  (6.592) 
ln_dur2 -0.167  0.383  0.165  0.341  2.224 
 (0.161)  (0.540)  (0.062)**  (0.685)  (1.337) 
ln_size 0.658  2.286  0.148  -4.192  2.142 
 (0.222)**  (0.742)**  (0.085)  (0.941)**  (1.837) 
ln_age 2.385  2.355  -0.179  14.060  13.828 
 (1.054)*  (3.524)  (0.406)  (4.473)**  (8.731) 
ln_age2 -0.366  -0.372  -0.025  -2.176  -2.311 
 (0.177)*  (0.592)  (0.068)  (0.751)**  (1.466) 
Observations 509  509  509  509  509 
R-squared 0.123  0.101  0.153  0.187  0.166 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,481)     
(1) no bank  0.022  0.052  0.003  <0.117  0.324 
(2) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(3) no age  0.067  0.796  0.003  0.005  0.282 






Figure 1.  Dummy (1) variables and second-order polynomial 
      (2) of logarithm of number of relationships for all 
     firms 
 
This figure shows the estimated relationship between each performance measure and two 
models of that relationship for all firms in our sample for all years. One model, 
dummies_model, uses a separate dummy variable for each number of relationships with 
banks from one to 20. This is completely unrestricted. The second model, ln_model, uses 
a second-order polynomial of the logarithm of the number of relationships with banks. 
The performance variables are 1. ROA, the ratio of net earnings to total assets, 2. ROE, 
the ratio of net earnings to net worth, 3. interest over assets, the ratio of interest expense 
to total assets, 4. non-interest over assets, the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets, 
and 5. sales over assets, the ratio of net sales to total assets. All variables are in 
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Figure 2.  Dummy (1) variables and second-order polynomial 
      (2) of logarithm of number of relationships for 
     small  firms 
 
This figure shows the estimated relationship between each performance measure and two 
models of that relationship for small firms in our sample for all years. A small firm is a 
firm with no more than 50 employees. One model, dummies_model, uses a separate 
dummy variable for each number of relationships with banks. This is completely 
unrestricted. The second model, ln_model, uses a second-order polynomial of the 
logarithm of the number of relationships with banks. The performance variables are 1. 
ROA, the ratio of net earnings to total assets, 2. ROE, the ratio of net earnings to net 
worth, 3. interest over assets, the ratio of interest expense to total assets, 4. non-interest 
over assets, the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets, and 5. sales over assets, the 
ratio of net sales to total assets. All variables are in percentage terms. The sample is from 
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Figure 3.  Dummy (1) variables and second-order polynomial 
  (2) of logarithm of number of relationships for 
 medium  firms 
 
This figure shows the estimated relationship between each performance measure and two 
models of that relationship for medium-sized firms in our sample for all years. A medium 
firm is a firm with 51 to 250 employees. One model, dummies_model, uses a separate 
dummy variable for each number of relationships with banks. This is completely 
unrestricted. The second model, ln_model, uses a second-order polynomial of the 
logarithm of the number of relationships with banks. The performance variables are 1. 
ROA, the ratio of net earnings to total assets, 2. ROE, the ratio of net earnings to net 
worth, 3. interest over assets, the ratio of interest expense to total assets, 4. non-interest 
over assets, the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets, and 5. sales over assets, the 
ratio of net sales to total assets. All variables are in percentage terms. The sample is from 
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Figure 4.  Dummy (1) variables and second-order polynomial 
      (2) of logarithm of number of relationships for 
     large  firms 
 
This figure shows the estimated relationship between each performance measure and two 
models of that relationship for large firms in our sample for all years. A large firm is a 
firm with more than 250 employees. One model, dummies_model, uses a separate 
dummy variable for each number of relationships with banks. This is completely 
unrestricted. The second model, ln_model, uses a second-order polynomial of the 
logarithm of the number of relationships with banks. The performance variables are 1. 
ROA, the ratio of net earnings to total assets, 2. ROE, the ratio of net earnings to net 
worth, 3. interest over assets, the ratio of interest expense to total assets, 4. non-interest 
over assets, the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets, and 5. sales over assets, the 
ratio of net sales to total assets. All variables are in percentage terms. The sample is from 
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Definition of variables 
 
1) Performance  variables: 
 
  –  ROA= (net earnings/ total assets)*100 
  –  ROE = (net earnings/ net worth)*100 
  –  Interest over Assets = (interest expenses/ total assets)*100 
  –  Non-interest over Assets = ((non-interest expenses) /Total Assets)*100. 
Non-interest expenses is complementary to interest expenses meaning 
that the two sum up to total expenses. 




  –  bank1, bank2, ... ,bank20 = dummies equal to 1 if 1,2,...,20 relationships 
and 0 otherwise 
  –  ln bank = natural logarithm of number of banks with which the firms had 
commercial relationships at the end of 2000 
  –  ln bank2 = ln bank squared 
  –  ln dur = natural logarithm of number of years a bank has been the main 
lender of the firm at the end of 2000 
  –  ln dur2 = ln dur squared 
  –  ln size = natural logarithm of net sales 
  –  ln age = natural logarithm of (2001– firm’s year of birth) 
  –  ln age2 = ln age squared 
 –  indi = industry dummies 




Table A2.1  Estimated OLS regressions with dummy variables 
 
Dependent variables are the five performance indicators: 1. ROA, the ratio of net earnings 
to total assets; 2. ROE, the ratio of net earnings to net worth; 3. interest over assets, the 
ratio of interest expense to total assets, 4. non-interest over assets, the ratio of non-interest 
expense to total assets, and 5. sales over assets, the ratio of net sales to total assets. All 
variables are in percentage terms. The size classes are 1. small (from 1 to 50 employees), 
2. medium (from 51 to 250 employees) and 3. large (greater than 250 employees). In 
addition to the coefficients reported, each regression also includes 19 industries dummy 
variables (see footnote 8) and two dummy variables for 1998 and 1999. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. The second part of the table reports p-values of F-tests performed 
comparing equation (3.2) with in turn: 1. the same specification without the bank 
variables, 2. the same specification without the duration variables; 3. the same 
specification without the age variables.  
 
All Firms 









bank1 5.135  14.113  -2.110  -0.011  30.018 
 (0.609)**  5.078  0.106  -2.228  10.906 
bank2 4.863  13.332  -1.775  2.051  31.928 
  (0.582)** (2.113)**  (0.254)** (3.673) (6.319)** 
bank3 4.402  12.741  -1.534  1.984  29.904 
  (0.577)** (2.094)**  (0.251)** (3.642) (6.265)** 
bank4 3.708  11.676  -1.055  -0.135  25.801 
  (0.576)** (2.091)**  (0.251)** (3.636) (6.254)** 
bank5 3.188  10.803  -0.774  0.232  26.816 
  (0.574)** (2.086)**  (0.250)** (3.626) (6.238)** 
bank6 2.827  10.120  -0.477  -1.363  25.400 
 (0.579)**  (2.101)**  (0.252)  (3.654)  (6.286)** 
bank7 2.581  9.516  -0.382  -2.234  20.274 
 (0.588)**  (2.135)**  (0.256)  (3.713)  (6.387)** 
bank8 2.220  7.691  -0.255  -1.231  19.281 
 (0.594)**  (2.158)**  (0.259)  (3.752)  (6.455)** 
bank9 1.949  7.049  0.075  -4.655  18.489 
 (0.628)**  (2.281)**  (0.274)  (3.967)  (6.823)** 
bank10 1.879  6.024  -0.167  -4.227  8.245 
 (0.590)**  (2.145)**  (0.257)  (3.729)  (6.415) 
bank11  0.970  (2.214)**  (0.266)** (3.849) (6.622)** 
 (0.658)  (2.391)*  (0.287)  (4.158)  (7.152) 
bank12 2.273  8.923  -0.346  -4.003  10.687 
 (0.653)**  (2.374)**  (0.285)  (4.127)  (7.100) 
bank13 0.947  4.419  0.319  0.131  24.353 
 (0.752)  (2.732)  (0.328)  (4.751)  (8.172)** 
bank14 1.738  7.798  0.043  -3.148  22.952 
 (0.820)*  (2.981)**  (0.358)  (5.182)  (8.915)* 
bank15 1.553  7.897  0.667  -5.521  3.265 
 (0.711)*  (2.584)**  (0.310)*  (4.493)  (7.729)  
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bank16 1.285  3.429  0.058  -0.990  24.497 
 (0.966)  (3.509)  (0.421)  (6.101)  (10.495)* 
bank17 3.191  10.109  0.620  6.419  7.492 
 (1.497)*  (5.439)  (0.653)  (9.457)  (16.268) 
bank18 1.534  3.389  0.456  -6.052  2.720 
 (1.156)  (4.200)  (0.504)  (7.303)  (12.564) 
bank19 0.395  0.838  -1.376  37.519  5.236 
 (2.473)  (8.985)  (1.078)  (15.622)*  (26.874) 
bank20 0.610  2.286  0.384  -12.939  -11.240 
  (0.870)  (3.159)  (0.379) (5.493)* (9.449) 
ln_dur 0.210  -0.891  -0.216  9.582  19.183 
 (0.298)  (1.083)  (0.130)  (1.883)**  (3.239)** 
ln_dur2 -0.018  0.237  0.031  -1.649  -3.098 
 (0.060)  (0.218)  (0.026)  (0.379)**  (0.652)** 
ln_size 0.846  2.046  -0.360  -3.886  3.227 
 (0.048)**  (0.174)**  (0.021)**  (0.303)**  (0.520)** 
ln_age 0.865  -6.738  0.075  -4.680  -4.963 
  (0.321)** (1.166)**  (0.140) (2.028)* (3.489) 
ln_age2 -0.184  0.659  -0.052  0.440  -0.760 
 (0.056)**  (0.205)**  (0.025)*  (0.356)  (0.613) 
constant -9.118  -3.829  6.941  85.823  69.381 
 (0.930)**  (3.379)  (0.406)**  (5.875)**  (10.106)*
* 
observations 9996  9996  9996  9996  9996 
r-squared 0.078  0.058  0.112  0.162  0.080 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,9967)     
(a) no bank   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(b) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(c) no age  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 










bank1 3.242  5.674  -0.833  8.498  16.379 
 (1.302)*  (4.788)  (0.535)  6.741  (14.238) 
bank2 2.841  4.696  -0.477  10.841  18.304 
 (1.288)*  (4.737)  (0.529)  (8.389)  (14.086) 
bank3 2.279  3.757  -0.213  10.549  14.967 
 (1.286)  (4.730)  (0.528)  (8.376)  (14.064) 
bank4  1.439 2.632 0.327  9.543  10.899 
 (1.286)  (4.731)  (0.528)  (8.378)  (14.068) 
bank5  0.841 1.771 0.688  8.722  10.036 
 (1.287)  (4.734)  (0.529)  (8.383)  (14.076) 
bank6  0.380 0.628 0.996  8.134 7.822 
 (1.291)  (4.749)  (0.530)  (8.411)  (14.122) 
bank7  0.048 -1.451 1.257  4.674 -3.146 
 (1.300)  (4.779)  (0.534)*  (8.464)  (14.211) 
bank8 -0.251  -2.412  1.194  7.023  -1.943 
 (1.307)  (4.806)  (0.537)*  (8.511)  (14.291) 
bank9 -1.046  -5.616  1.475  3.897  3.972 
 (1.341)  (4.932)  (0.551)**  (8.735)  (14.667) 
bank10 -0.445  -3.092  1.277  4.178  -14.335 
 (1.314)  (4.834)  (0.540)*  (8.560)  (14.373) 
bank11 -0.493  -0.818  1.970  (8.480)  -4.075 
 (1.412)  (5.191)  (0.580)**  (9.193)  (15.436) 
bank12 -0.915  -1.719  1.366  3.889  -19.100 
 (1.476)  (5.428)  (0.606)*  (9.612)  (16.139) 
bank13 -1.595  -5.554  1.591  7.248  -6.690 
 (1.563)  (5.747)  (0.642)*  (10.177)  (17.089) 
bank14 -1.738  -5.336  1.277  10.390  -0.455 
 (1.665)  (6.124)  (0.684)  (10.845)  (18.210) 
bank15 -1.107  -0.601  2.358  -3.202  -14.634 
 (1.687)  (6.205)  (0.693)**  (10.989)  (18.451) 
bank16 -1.938  -11.086  1.573  3.614  4.976 
 (1.816)  (6.680)  (0.746)*  (11.830)  (19.864) 
bank17 -1.834  -4.852  2.013  -4.367  -41.646 
  (2.761) (10.152) (1.134)  (17.979)  (30.188) 
bank18  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
bank19  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
bank20 7.054  3.069  -0.710  -20.839  -53.041 
  (4.425) (16.274) (1.817)  (28.820)  (48.390) 
ln_dur  0.010 -0.670 0.094  12.379  23.469 
 (0.355)  (1.305)  (0.146)  (2.312)**  (3.881)** 
ln_dur2 0.015  0.239  -0.031  -2.098  -3.945 
 (0.072)  (0.265)  (0.030)  (0.469)**  (0.787)** 
ln_size 1.637  4.582  -0.538  -4.510  16.047 
  (0.083)** (0.306)** (0.034)**  (0.542)** (0.911)** 
ln_age  0.714 -8.619 0.045  -6.034 -9.301 
  (0.374) (1.376)** (0.154)  (2.437)* (4.091)*  
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ln_age2  -0.152 0.931 -0.039  0.572 -0.101 
 (0.067)*  (0.246)**  (0.027)  (0.435)  (0.731) 
constant -12.653  -12.417  6.604  79.176  -14.207 
  (1.583)** (5.822)* (0.650)** (10.310)**  (17.311) 
observations 7778  7778  7778  7778  7778 
r-squared  0.093 0.072 0.143  0.159 0.110 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,7733)     
(a) no bank   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(b) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(c) no age  0.031  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 










bank1 2.498  10.233  -2.332  -6.375  11.484 
 (1.435)  (5.029)*  -0.728  (8.332)  (14.396) 
bank2 4.571  13.922  -1.899  -2.466  25.422 
 (1.166)**  (4.087)**  (0.684)**  (6.771)  (11.699)* 
bank3 4.105  12.643  -1.960  5.104  29.528 
 (1.157)**  (4.053)**  (0.678)**  (6.715)  (11.602)* 
bank4 4.149  11.398  -1.512  -7.541  14.608 
 (1.143)**  (4.005)**  (0.670)*  (6.635)  (11.465) 
bank5 3.653  9.753  -1.525  0.134  23.025 
 (1.131)**  (3.963)*  (0.663)*  (6.566)  (11.344)* 
bank6 3.112  9.666  -1.035  -4.708  21.466 
 (1.141)**  (3.998)*  (0.669)  (6.623)  (11.444) 
bank7 2.830  11.658  -1.158  1.312  27.820 
 (1.148)*  (4.022)**  (0.673)  (6.664)  (11.513)* 
bank8 2.495  7.676  -0.680  -2.045  18.392 
 (1.157)*  (4.055)  (0.679)  (6.719)  (11.608) 
bank9 2.590  10.045  -0.239  -5.505  10.615 
 (1.170)*  (4.100)*  (0.686)  (6.793)  (11.736) 
bank10 1.615  4.662  -0.494  -4.484  12.141 
 (1.142)  (4.001)  (0.669)  (6.629)  (11.453) 
bank11 1.161  4.397  (0.841)**  -3.998  10.085 
 (1.200)  (4.207)  (0.704)  (6.970)  (12.042) 
bank12 2.376  8.429  -0.975  -8.267  7.945 
 (1.187)*  (4.161)*  (0.696)  (6.893)  (11.910) 
bank13 1.103  4.008  -0.331  -0.001  33.062 
 (1.267)  (4.441)  (0.743)  (7.358)  (12.713)**
bank14 2.436  9.684  -0.263  -9.203  11.512 
 (1.308)  (4.585)*  (0.767)  (7.596)  (13.124) 
bank15 0.569  2.107  -0.080  -2.659  2.889 
 (1.248)  (4.373)  (0.732)  (7.245)  (12.517) 
bank16 4.415  13.371  -0.776  -2.243  38.123 
 (1.920)*  (6.727)*  (1.126)  (11.145)  (19.256)*  
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bank17 6.503  19.175  1.563  27.395  33.625 
 (3.907)  (13.691)  (2.291)  (22.684)  (39.192) 
bank18 0.415  1.295  0.855  -9.853  -23.529 
 (1.903)  (6.668)  (1.116)  (11.047)  (19.087) 
bank19 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
bank20 1.299  2.598  -0.761  -21.954  -13.849 
 (1.467)  (5.141)  (0.860)  (8.517)*  (14.716) 
ln_dur 0.685  -0.285  -0.673  6.444  19.638 
 (0.693)  (2.430)  (0.407)  (4.026)  (6.956)** 
ln_dur2 -0.085  0.059  0.137  -1.289  -3.074 
 (0.136)  (0.475)  (0.080)  (0.787)  (1.361)* 
ln_size 1.251  3.319  -0.254  -7.248  8.171 
 (0.139)**  (0.486)**  (0.081)**  (0.805)**  (1.390)** 
ln_age -0.043  -5.065  0.186  -9.766  -4.951 
 (0.792)  (2.774)  (0.464)  (4.596)*  (7.941) 
ln_age2 -0.077  0.453  -0.072  1.398  0.163 
 (0.133)  (0.465)  (0.078)  (0.770)  (1.330) 
constant -12.566  -19.644  6.815  134.143  5.867 
 (2.272)**  (7.960)*  (1.332)**  (13.188)**  (22.786) 
observations 1709  1709  1709  1709  1709 
r-squared 0.170  0.131  0.077  0.217  0.128 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,1663)     
(a) no bank   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(b) no duration  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(c) no age  0.008  0.032  0.046  0.049  <0.001 












bank1 3.601  15.809  -0.618  9.243  41.069 
 (1.676)*  (5.535)**  0.687  4.256  7.003 
bank2 0.087  1.004  -0.586  12.595  17.863 
 (1.504)  (4.965)  (0.567)  (6.153)*  (11.867) 
bank3 3.593  13.553  0.366  3.384  0.876 
 (0.997)**  (3.292)**  (0.376)  (4.080)  (7.869) 
bank4 1.633  5.958  -0.649  2.644  7.815 
  (1.020) (3.368) (0.385) (4.173) (8.049) 
bank5  1.733 6.765 0.189 9.134 8.983 
  (0.989) (3.266)* (0.373) (4.047)* (7.806) 
bank6  2.484 8.230 0.200 3.787  10.308 
 (0.950)**  (3.136)**  (0.358)  (3.886)  (7.496) 
bank7 1.827  12.336  -0.120  6.925  17.288 
  (1.195) (3.946)** (0.451)  (4.890)  (9.431) 
bank8  1.269 9.035 0.575 3.914 1.941 
  (1.065) (3.516)* (0.402)  (4.357)  (8.403) 
bank9 -0.555  0.558  -0.686  -13.310  -27.892 
  (1.755) (5.795) (0.662) (7.181)  (13.850)* 
bank10 2.333  8.874  0.109  -5.504  -3.778 
 (0.874)**  (2.885)**  (0.329)  (3.575)  (6.896) 
bank11 -0.286  3.012  (0.632)  (6.859)  (13.230)** 
  (1.080) (3.566) (0.407) (4.418) (8.522) 
bank12  3.194 12.362 0.112  3.467 24.453 
 (0.952)**  (3.143)**  (0.359)  (3.894)  (7.511)** 
bank13 -0.489  1.982  2.290  1.407  -6.053 
 (1.521)  (5.021)  (0.573)**  (6.222)  (12.001) 
bank14 0.336  5.020  0.849  33.937  111.315 
 (2.336)  (7.714)  (0.881)  (9.558)**  (18.437)** 
bank15 2.177  14.182  1.289  -0.998  2.318 
 (0.993)*  (3.279)**  (0.374)**  (4.063)  (7.837) 
bank16  0.329 2.491 0.419 9.917  14.089 
  (1.465) (4.837) (0.552) (5.994)  (11.561) 
bank17  4.167 13.882 0.784  9.696 23.601 
 (1.876)*  (6.195)*  (0.708)  (7.677)  (14.807) 
bank18 1.433  3.137  0.315  -3.947  17.137 
  (1.390) (4.589) (0.524) (5.686)  (10.968) 
bank19 0.071  3.887  -0.262  46.314  12.176 
 (2.340)  (7.726)  (0.882)  (9.574)**  (18.467) 
bank20 0.760  4.799  1.284  -3.615  -4.633 
 (1.112)  (3.671)  (0.419)**  (4.549)  (8.774) 
ln_dur  0.781 -2.630 -0.975 0.679 -7.322 
 (0.831)  (2.745)  (0.314)**  (3.402)  (6.562) 
ln_dur2  -0.179 0.348 0.175 0.059 1.642 
 (0.168)  (0.553)  (0.063)**  (0.685)  (1.322) 
ln_size 0.616  2.234  0.117  -3.143  2.791 
  (0.227)**  (0.748)** (0.085) (0.927)** (1.789) 
ln_age 2.578  3.786  0.142  12.368  11.045 
  (1.060)*  (3.500)  (0.400) (4.337)** (8.366)  
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ln_age2  -0.401 -0.647 -0.085 -1.942 -2.038 
  (0.179)*  (0.590)  (0.067) (0.731)** (1.410) 
constant -10.060  -24.554  1.834  62.680  82.684 
 (3.291)**  (10.866)*  (1.241)  (13.465)**  (25.971)** 
observations  509 509 509 509 509 
r-squared  0.186 0.186 0.247 0.298 0.297 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,463)     
(a) no bank  0.002  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(b)  no  duration  <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(c) no age  0.048  0.546  <0.001  0.016  0.334 
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